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We examine the effects of introducing actuarially fair annuity markets into an overlapping
generations model of endogenous growth. The complete annuitisation of agents’ wealth is not, in
general, dynamically optimal ; the degree of annuitisation that is dynamically optimal depends
nonmonotonically on the expected length of retirement and on the pay-as-you-go social security tax
rate. The government has an incentive to restrict the availability of actuarially fair annuities
contracts, and can often move the economy from a pay-as-you-go to a fully-funded social security
system via voluntary contributions to a government sponsored, actuarially fair pension today
accompanied by reductions in social security taxes tomorrow.
When agents face uncertain lifetimes, Yaari (1965) shows that the welfare of
retirees is increased by the introduction of actuarially fair annuities. However,
such annuities may be unavailable because of market failures caused by
asymmetric information between the insurer and the insured. If this is the case,
saving is, in general, suboptimally high in steady-state equilibrium
(Eichenbaum and Peled, 1987) and the introduction of a mandatory, fully-
funded social security scheme can often improve upon the steady-state market
outcome (Sheshinski and Weiss, 1981 ; Abel, 1986 ; Eckstein et al. 1985a, b ;
Townley and Boadway, 1988). These results have led to the belief that
increasing the availability of actuarially fair annuities will increase social
welfare.
In this paper we examine the effects of introducing a government sponsored
actuarially fair annuity market, a[ la Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), into an
overlapping generations model" with external effects and growth. We examine
two means of accessing the annuity markets. First, the government allows
individuals to make voluntary contributions to an actuarially fair pension plan,
but places a limit on contributions. Secondly, the government mandates
contributions to an actuarially fair pension plan. We find that under both
programmes, the complete annuitisation of agents’ wealth, while individually
optimal, is often not socially optimal, even in steady-state equilibrium, because
agents may underaccumulate relative to the social optimum. Along an
equilibrium growth path, full annuitisation may not be dynamically optimal
because the ‘excess ’ saving generated by unintentional bequests and incomplete
annuitisation provides the fuel for the endogenously generated component of
* We would like to thank Giuseppe Bertola, who provided the idea for this paper, the seminar participants
at Michigan State University and an anonymous referee for comments. The views expressed in this paper
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis,
nor of the Federal Reserve System.
" The overlapping generations model was developed by Samuelson (1958) and Allais (1947), and
extended by Diamond (1965) from an endowment to an economy in which goods are produced using labour
and capital. This basic framework has been utilised extensively in recent studies of endogenous growth. See,
for example, Jones and Manuelli (1992).
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economic growth. Further, the degree of annuitisation (the percentage of
wealth that is annuitised, voluntarily or by mandate) that is dynamically
optimal depends nonmonotonically on the expected length of retirement under
both pension plans, nonmonotonically on the pay-as-you-go social security tax
rate under the voluntary pension plan, and on the weights the social planner
places on current and future generations.
While incomplete annuitisation is usually dynamically optimal, Pareto
improvements are often available via increases in annuitisation rates coupled
with decreases in the future social security tax rate, and increases in the
annuitisation rate coupled with the complete phasing out of the pay-as-you-go
social security tax rate in the future. This suggests that the government could
phase out the current social security system, replacing it with a government
sponsored, actuarially fair pension scheme. Since full annuitisation of agents’
wealth is not socially optimal, the government has an incentive to restrict the
availability of actuarially fair annuity contracts.
i. the environment
Consider an infinite-horizon economy comprised of identical two-period lived
agents, perfectly competitive firms, annuity markets, and a government. A new
generation (called generation t) is born at each date t¯ 1, 2, 3,…. Assume that
there is no population growth, and that, at each date t, N agents are born.
Without loss of generality assume N is unity.
Agents in this model, as in Eckstein et al. (1985a), are not altruistic : the old
do not care for the young and the young do not care for the old. Agents in the
first period of their lives, the young, are endowed with one unit of labour which
they supply inelastically to firms. They divide their wages between their own
current consumption, saving (held either as an annuity, as direct holdings of
capital, or both) for consumption when old, and payment of social security
taxes quoted as a proportion of their wages. Agents in the final period of their
lives, the old, supply their savings inelastically to firms and consume their social
security benefits and the return to their savings. An agent dies at the onset of
old age with probability (1®p) and lives throughout old age with probability
p.# If an agent dies ‘young’, his unannuitised wealth is bequeathed to his
children.$
Let the representative member of generation t’s preferences be represented by
U¯ ln c
t
(t)­p ln c
t
(t­1),
where c
t
(t) is consumption by a member of generation t when young, c
t
(t­1)
is consumption by a member of generation t when old.
# Agents in this model face uncertainty about the time of death but not about the maximum possible
length of life. This implies that agents may die before they have exhausted their non-social security non-
annuitised wealth, but not ice ersa.
$ This assumption of unintentional rather than altruistic bequests is consistent with empirical findings by
numerous researchers : see Hurd (1990), Auerbach et al. (1992), and Bo$ rsch-Supan (1993), as well as the
empirical finding of Altonji et al. (1992) that parents and their adult children are not altruistically linked.
But, other research finds an operative bequest motive (Hamermesh and Menchik, 1987 ; Hurd, 1995), at least
among the wealthy. Since the jury is still out, we will maintain the assumption of unintentional bequests.
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The firms are perfectly competitive profit maximisers that produce output
using the production function Y(t)¯A(t)K(t)b N(t)"−b, b ` [0, 1]. K(t) is the
capital stock at t, N(t) is employment at t, and A(t)" 0 is a productivity scalar.
Capital depreciates fully in the production process.% The production function
can be written in intensive form as (t)¯A(t) k(t)b, where k(t) is the capital-
labour ratio. Assume, because of external effects of aggregate capital on
productivity, as discussed in Romer (1986), A(t)¯ a(t)K(t)g, a(t)" 0, g " 0,
so that the aggregate capital stock, K(t), enters the technology as a constant
from the perspective of current producers.&
The government in this economy can impose social security taxes, s(t), on
the wages of the young at t. The government must fully fund all expenditures
with tax receipts. Assume, following Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), that
actuarially fair annuity contracts are unavailable on the private market. The
government overcomes the market failure by establishing a market in
actuarially fair annuity contracts. The government can control access to this
market in one of two ways. It can either make the purchase of an annuity
voluntary or mandatory. Under the voluntary plan, Plan V, each agent may
place up to cv(t)% of his total saving in an annuity.' Under the mandatory
plan, Plan M, each agent must place a fixed amount, sM, in an annuity.
The representative agent at time t takes as given the wage, W(t), bequests,
Bt
t−"
(t), the return on saving when old, q(t­1), the tax rate, s(t), social security
benefits, T
t
(t­1),( and the government pension plan. Under Plan V the agent
takes as given the maximum percentage of saving that can be annuitised, cv(t),
and the excess return on annuities, av(t­1). Under Plan M he takes as given
the mandatory contribution, sM, and the return on these annuities, aM(t­1).
The agent chooses saving, s(t), to maximise
ln c
t
(t)­p ln c
t
(t­1) (1)
subject to, under Plan V,
c
t
(t)¯W(t) [1®s(t)]®s(t)­B(t), (2)
c
t
(t­1)¯ [1­q(t­1)­av(t­1)] s(t)­T(t­1) (3)
or subject to, under Plan M,
% The production process is over the course of a generation. Since empirically the depreciation rate is
about 10% per year, capital is all but fully depreciated over the course of a 25 year generation. We assume,
therefore, that capital is fully used up in the production process.
& We have chosen the functional forms for utility and production to guarantee a closed form solution and
to facilitate the simulation exercises summarised in Section V, below.
' The voluntary scheme loosely resembles the current IRA legislation under which individuals can
annually invest up to $2,000 in a tax deferred Individual Retirement Account. Here agents can save only
their after tax income, but by restricting access to the annuity market, the government policy both affects
the return on investment and bequests.
( We assume that the social security system is of the pay-as-you-go variety, and that one’s benefits depend
not on one’s own contributions, but on the next generations’. In this system social security transfers are lump
sum. This is consistent with the literature (see, for example, Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) or McCandless
and Wallace (1991)), and can be interpreted as social security benefits being paid out at a constant rate
over an agent’s retirement. While most pay-as-you-go social security systems do link benefits to contributions,
the redistributive element of these system and the legislated changes in the benefits formulae make the
connection between one’s contributions and one’s benefits loose. To simplify the analysis we assume no link
between benefits and contributions.
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c
t
¯W(t) [1®s(t)]®s(t)®sM­B(t), (2«)
c
t
(t­1)¯ [1­q(t­1)] s(t)­[1­aM(t­1)] sM­T(t­1), (3«)
where constraints (2) and (2«) encompass the assumption that bequests are
allocated equally across all members of a generation, as in Hubbard and Judd
(1987). This assumption ensures that bequests do not induce a non-trivial
wealth distribution onto this economy comprised of representative agents.
Further, it restricts uncertainty to the timing of death alone. Also, the return
on saving in constraint (3) is stated as the sum of the return to direct holdings
of capital, 1­q(t­1), and the excess return, prorated over all saving, of
holding cv(t)% of saving as an annuity, av(t­1). Since, as Yaari (1965) and
Shenshinski and Weiss (1981) show, agents without a bequest motive would
prefer to annuitise all their wealth, they will annuitise their wealth up to the
legal restriction. Under Plan M, 1­aM(t­1) is the actuarially fair return on
the government mandated pension.
Substituting constraints (2) and (3) ((2«) and (3«)) into the objective function
(1) and maximising yields the first-order condition for Plan V
®1
W(t)[1®s(t)]®s(t)­B(t)
­
p[1­q(t­1)­av(t­1)]
[1­q(t­1)­av(t­1)] s(t)­T(t­1)
¯ 0 (4)
and for Plan M
®1
W(t) [1®s(t)]®s(t)®sM­B(t)
­
p[1­q(t­1)]
[1­q(t­1)] s(t)­[1­aM(t­1)] sM­T(t­1)
¯ 0. (4«)
Agents equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
saving to the return to saving, the marginal rate of transformation.
The individual firm takes wages, rental rates, and the aggregate stock of
capital as given. It hires labour and capital until their marginal products equal
their factor prices
a(t)K(t)g (1®b) k(t)b ¯W(t), (5)
a(t)K(t)g bk(t)b−"¯ r(t). (6)
Because of the assumptions of constant returns production technology and
inelastic labour supply, (5) and (6) also define factor market clearing.
The government must maintain a balanced budget. Thus, total outlays to
the old who live throughout their last period of life must equal total revenues
from social security taxes
pT(t­1)¯W(t­1) s(t­1).
Therefore, T(t­1)¯
W(t­1) s(t­1)
p
. (7)
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If an agent dies young, then the unannuitised portion of his wealth
B(t­1)¯ [1®cv(t)] (1®p) [1­q(t­1)] s(t), (8)
under Plan V is distributed to his heirs, where (1®cv(t)) is the percentage of
wealth not annuitised. The annuitised portion is distributed, pro rata, among
the other holders of annuities
pav(t­1) s(t)¯cv(t)(1®p) [1­q(t­1)] s(t).
Thus, the excess return on saving from holding cv(t)% as an annuity is
av(t­1)¯
cv(t)(1®p) [1­q(t­1)]
p
. (9)
If an agent dies young under plan M his wealth at death
B(t­1)¯ (1®p) [1­q(t­1)] s(t) (8«)
is distributed to his heirs. The return on the mandated savings of the old who
live throughout their old age is
[1­aM(t­1)]¯
[1­q(t­1)]
p
. (9«)
The goods market clears when demand for goods equals supply of goods.
Under Plan V, goods market clearing is defined by
c
t
(t)­pc
t−"
(t)­s(t)¯W(t)­r(t) k(t). (10)
Substituting equations (2), (3) and (7)–(9) into (10) yields
s(t)¯ k(t­1), (11)
where by arbitrage
r(t­1)¯ 1­q(t­1). (12)
Under Plan M goods market clearing is defined by
c
t
(t)­pc
t−"
(t)­s(t)­sM¯W(t)­r(t) k(t). (10«)
Substituting equations (2«), (3«) and (7), (8«) and (9«) into (10«) yields
s(t)­sM¯ k(t­1) (11«)
and (12). In equation (11«) let s(t)¯ [1®cM(t)] k(t­1) and sM¯cM(t) k(t­1).
Saving at date t, under both plans, totally determines the capital stock at date
t­1, and the return on capital equals the return on saving.
i i. equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for a Plan V [Plan M] economy is a sequence of
prices ²W(t), r(t),q(t),av(t) [aM(t)]´¢
t="
, a sequence of allocations ²c
t
(t), c
t−"
(t)´¢
t="
and a sequence of capital stocks, ²k(t)´¢
t="
, k(1)" 0 given, such that given these
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prices and allocations, agents’ utility is maximised, firms’ profits are maximised,
the government budget constraint is satisfied, and markets clear.
The Plan V [Plan M] equilibrium is fully characterised by equations (2)–(9),
(11) and (12) [(2«)–(9«), (11«) and (12)]. Substituting (8)–(10), (11) and (12)
into (4) yields for Plan V
k(t­1)¯
E
F
a(t) p²(1®b) [1®s(t)]­b(1®p) [1®cv(t®1)]´
1­p­
ps(t­1)(1®b)
b[p­cv(t)(1®p)]
G
H
k(t)b+g. (13)
Substituting (8«)–(10«), (11«) and (12) into (4«) yields for Plan M
k(t­1)¯
E
F
a(t) p²(1®b) [1®s(t)]­b(1®p) [1®cM(t®1)]´
1­p­
cM(t)(1®p)
p
­
(1®b) s(t­1)
b
G
H
k(t)b+g. (13«)
These difference equations describe the dynamic paths of the Plan V and Plan
M economies, respectively.
i i i. the steady state
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) find, in the context of an endowment economy
with an exogenously fixed return on saving, that the socially optimal fully
funded social security scheme for agents who have no bequest motive is one in
which agents place all their savings in annuities. In their model individual
optimality and social optimality coincide. In our models, because of the
internal effect of capital accumulation on the interest rate and the external
effect of the aggregate capital stock on productivity, this link is broken.
Consequently, cv¯cM¯ 1, or full annuitisation, while still individually
optimal is not, in general, socially optimal in our models.
Proposition 1 : Let the social Welfare function be defined as the stead-state utilit of
the representatie agent. Further, assume that social securit taxes, s, and benefits, T, are
uniquel equal to ero, and that cv(t)¯cvct, and cM(t)¯cMct. Then, social Welfare
is maximised at, for Plan V
cv¯
p
(1®p#)b
[(1®b®g)®b(1­p)],
and, for Plan M, cM is implicitl defined b
(1­p)
p­cM(1®p)
®91­p(b­g)1®b®g :
¬9 b(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cM)­
1
p(1­p)­cM(1®p):¯ 0.)
In these models, because of the effects of capital accumulation on the interest
rate and aggregate productivity, the income effect of bequests generated by an
) The proofs of the propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
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annuitisation rate less than one may increase social welfare by generating a
superior consumption allocation. This leads to a divergence of individual
preferences from social preferences. When this is the case, the social planner will
be compelled to restrict the proportion of an individual’s wealth that can be
invested in an annuity.
iv. comparative dynamics
The external effect of capital on aggregate productivity, while positive, has not
been found empirically to be strong enough to generate growth. However,
under conditions of exogenous technological progress, the external effect is
growth enhancing. How growth is affected by full and}or partial annuitisation,
the method of annuitisation, and of a longer period of retirement in various
social security tax regimes is detailed below.
Proposition 2 : Let the social securit tax rate s(t)¯ sct. Then, under both Plans
V and M, economies With higher social securit tax rates hae sloWer rates of groWth.
An increase in the social security tax rate imposes a negative income effect
on the young and a positive income effect on the old via higher social security
benefits. Both effects reduce the incentive to save, which reduces capital
accumulation and hence the growth rate. This result is common to many
endogenous growth models.*
Proposition 3 : Assume the annuitisation rates cv(t)¯cvct and cM(t)¯cMct.
Under both Plans V and M, in economies in Which all Wealth is annuitised, cv¯cM¯ 1,
groWth is increasing in longeit"! (the expected length of retirement, p). In economies
in Which Wealth is not totall annuitised, cv! 1[cM! 1], greater longeit leads to either
higher or loWer groWth.
If all wealth is annuitised, then the rate of growth is increasing in the length
of life. This is because greater longevity heightens the incentive to save, thereby
increasing capital accumulation. If wealth is only partially annuitised, an
increase in life span reduces bequests while at the same time decreasing the
marginal return to the annuity and decreasing social security benefits, since the
tax revenues must be shared among the larger population of long-lived old.
The first two effects reduce while the last effect increases the incentive to save;
the net effect is ambiguous. Therefore, growth may either increase or decline
as the population ages. If social security taxes are an increasing function of the
expected length of retirement, a longer life may imply no change in annual
benefits. In this case, greater longevity reduces capital accumulation and,
thereby, growth.
Proposition 4 : Assume first that the social securit tax rate s(t)¯ s¯ 0ct, and the
annuitisation rates cv(t)¯cM(t)¯c" 0ct. Then, under Plans V and M economies
* See, e.g. King and Rebelo (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Saint-Paul (1992).
"! We model an increase in longevity as an increase in the length of retirement rather than an increase
in the lengths of youth and old age. This is consistent with Hamermesh (1984) who finds that workers who
live longer save more but do not work more than their shorter lived colleagues.
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With higher annuitisation rates exhibit sloWer groWth. NoW assume that s" 0, and
cv(t)¯cv" 0ct and cM(t)¯cM" 0ct. Then economies With higher annuitisation
rates exhibit either sloWer or faster rates of groWth under Plan V, and exhibit sloWer rates
of groWth under Plan M.
If a greater percentage of wealth is annuitised, bequests fall, imposing a
negative income effect on the young."" They respond to this by reducing saving
and consumption today. However, an increase in cv increases the return to
saving, which imposes a positive income effect on the young. At s¯ 0, under
Plan V, only the negative bequest effect is realised, leading to a reduction in
saving, and therefore growth. At s" 0 under Plan V, the bequest effect may
be weaker than the annuitisation effect. If so, saving and growth will rise. If
not, higher rates of annuitisation may lead to decreased saving and lower rates
of growth: actuarially fair annuities may decrease dynamic social welfare. This
is always the case under Plan M since changes in the rate of forced saving have
no effect on agents’ choices at the margin. Thus, policies that encourage the
young to invest in annuities to supplement their social security retirement
income may have the unintended side effect of benefiting one generation to the
detriment of those that follow.
Proposition 5 : Under both Plans V and M, groWth is maximised When the social
securit tax rate, s, and the annuitisation rates, cv and cM, all equal ero.
Growth in this model is linked to capital accumulation, so anything that
reduces the incentive to save, reduces capital accumulation, and thus growth.
Social security reduces the incentive to save by reducing disposable income
during one’s working years, and by guaranteeing a retirement income.
Allowing the young to annuitise their saving, conditional on not paying social
security, also reduces the incentive to save, because it reduces the risk of being
unable to predict accurately the timing of death. However, conditional on
there being a pay-as-you-go social security system, the optimal level of
annuitisation is not necessarily zero. This is because partial annuitisation of
one’s wealth under Plan V increases the marginal return to saving and thus can
increase capital accumulation enough to offset the loss in bequest income.
v. dynamic social welfare
While policies to increase economic growth benefit future generations, they will
not be Pareto improving if the current generation is made worse off. In this
section we examine the effects of changes in the legal restrictions on annuities
and of changes in the social security tax rate on the dynamic path of the
economy via simulation exercises. All variations are of Plan V, since any
increase in forced saving under Plan M is growth diminishing. Further, all
variations hold the utility of the initial old constant.
"" Weil (1993) examines the effects of uncertainty concerning the size and timing of bequests on the
consumption}saving decisions of the adult children of the aged. By choosing to ignore uncertainty about
bequests we recognise that our results concerning the effects of changes in the size of these bequests may be
overstated. We thus look on our results as upper bounds.
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We first created a set of baselines by calibrating the economy to achieve a
2% growth rate per year."# The parameters for the economy used in the
baseline simulations, given in Table 1, are based on empirical estimates for the
Table 1
Parameter Values for the Baseline Simulation
Parameter Value
s 0±127
c 0±165
p 0±20
b 0±30
g 0±10 to 0±70
US economy. The social security tax rate, s, is derived from OECD data on
social security contributions as a percentage of GDP, and adjusted for labour’s
share in output (1®b)."$ The degree of annuitisation, c, reflects the value of
private pension funds as a percentage of US household net wealth."% The aged-
dependency ratio, p, was set equal to the current ratio of the population aged
65 and over to the population between the ages of 20 and 64. The value for b
reflects capital’s share in output."& Since there is little empirical evidence on the
value of the external effect of capital on productivity, we allowed g to vary
between 0±1 and 0±7. Given the parameter values, the path of a(t), total factor
productivity, is chosen to produce the desired growth rate.
After calculating the baselines (one for each value of g), we changed various
parameter values and re-simulated the economy, keeping a(t) at its baseline
path. Comparing the result of these simulations with the baselines allows us to
make comparisons with respect to growth and dynamic social welfare.
Result 1 : Relatie to the set of baseline simulations, simulations in Which the
annuitisation rate, c, is raised up to 18±7% generate a groWth path that dominates the
baseline path. HoWeer, increases in c holding the social securit tax rate constant are not
Pareto improing.
From Proposition 4 we know that the growth rate increases or decreases with
the annuitisation rate when the tax rate is positive. Result 1 shows that in
comparison to the baseline, only minor increases in the annuitisation rate
produce an increase in the return to saving adequate to generate an increase
in saving. This increase in saving in turn raises the level of capital accumulation
and thus economic growth. But, this increase does not translate into an
"# In the simulations a period is 25 years, roughly equal to the time span of a generation.
"$ The social security data include employee and employer contributions to Medicare, and the old age
disability and death portion of social security. Mandatory pension contributions covering federal employees
are also included. For more details see OECD (1993).
"% See Auerbach et al. (1992). The results presented in this section are invariant to small changes in the
value of c.
"& Small changes in the value of b did not affect the results.
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increase in the path of lifetime utility for all generations. The lifetime utility of
the initial young rises but that of all future generations falls relative to the
baseline.
Three factors affect the consumption}saving choice of future generations :
the increased return to saving due to the higher annuitisation rate, the decline
in bequests, and the increase in wage income resulting from the higher capital
stock. The first factor raises saving and lowers consumption when young. The
second factor lowers both saving and consumption. The third factor raises both
saving and consumption. In sum, consumption when young falls and saving
rises relative to the baseline. The increase in saving and the higher rate of
return raises consumption when old. The net effect on lifetime utility is
negative. Thus, lifetime utility for all future generations falls relative to the
baseline.
Result 2 : Relatie to the baseline simulation, simulations in Which the annuitisation
rate is raised aboe its baseline alue (up to some threshold alue) in period t and in Which
the social securit tax rate is reduced in period t­1, generate a groWth path that dominates
the baseline path. Thus, increases in the annuitisation rate ma be Pareto improing.
Small increases in the annuitisation rate and the anticipated decrease in
future tax rates lead agents to increase their saving. Above some threshold
level, which is a positive function of the externality, g, and the size of the tax
cut, the reduction in bequests leads to a decrease in saving and hence capital
accumulation and growth. See Table 2.
Table 2
Maximum Value for c Generating a GroWth Path Aboe the Baseline Path.
(increasing c at t, decreasing s at t­)
g s
t+"
c
t
0±1 to 0±5 0±087 0±56
0±047 0±77
0 0±97
0±6 0±087 0±57
0±047 0±78
0 0±98
0±7 0±087 0±59
0±047 0±79
0 1
The initial young may be positively or negatively affected relative to the
baseline. The anticipated decline in s and the increase in the return to saving
(resulting from the increase in c) induce an increase in saving. The increase in
the return to saving results in an increase in consumption when old. When the
annuitisation rate is above the baseline level but below some threshold value,
c
L
, which is a negative function of g and a positive function of the size of the
tax rate cut, the benefit from the increased consumption when old is not enough
to offset the disutility from the decline in consumption when young. Therefore
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the lifetime utility of the initial young declines. When c&c
L
, the benefit from
increased consumption when old offsets the disutility from the decline in
consumption when young and lifetime utility of this generation rises. See
Table 3.
Table 3
Minimum and Maximum Values for c Generating a Lifetime Utilit Path Aboe the
Baseline (increasing c at t, decreasing s at t­)
g s
t+"
c
L
c
H
0±1 0±087 0±33 0±41
0±047 0±48 0±58
0 0±65 0±76
0±2 0±087 0±32 0±45
0±047 0±46 0±63
0 0±62 0±82
0±3 0±087 0±31 0±48
0±047 0±45 0±67
0 0±60 0±86
0±4 0±087 0±30 0±51
0±047 0±43 0±70
0 0±58 0±90
0±5 0±087 0±30 0±53
0±047 0±42 0±72
0 0±57 0±93
0±6 0±087 0±29 0±55
0±047 0±41 0±75
0 0±55 0±95
0±7 0±087 0±28 0±58
0±047 0±40 0±78
0 0±53 0±98
The income of each successive generation is negatively affected by a decline
in bequests resulting from an increase in c, but positively affected by the
increase in the capital stock, resulting from the increased saving of the initial
young. If c
L
%c%c
M
then the capital stock effect dominates and consumption
when young rises. Consumption when old always rises and thus lifetime utility
rises. If c
M
!c%c
H
(see Table 3 for the values of c
H
) consumption when
young falls. However, lifetime utility rises since the benefit from increased
consumption when old offsets the disutility from the decline in consumption
when young. Thus, if c
L
%c%c
H
a policy increasing c at t and decreasing s
at t­1 is Pareto improving.
Result 3 : Relatie to the baseline simulation, simulations in Which the annuitisation
rate is raised aboe its baseline alue in period t and possibl in periods t­1 to t­i, i" 1
as Well, and in Which the tax rate is reduced in period t­1 and possibl in periods t­2
to t­i, i" 2 as Well, generate a groWth path that dominates the baseline path. Thus
phasing out the pa-as-ou-go social securit sstem ma be Pareto improing.
Just how the government chooses to phase out the pay-as-you-go social
security system depends on the relative weights it places on current and future
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Fig. 1a. Lifetime utility eliminating the social security tax. Difference from baseline g¯ 0±1.
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Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D
Plan A: ç5 = 0.4, c6 = 0.55, ç7 = 0.75
Plan B: ç5 = 0.4, c6 = 0.55, ç7 = 0.75
Plan C: ç5 = 0.55
Plan D: ç5 = 0.75
ô6 = 0.087, ô7 = 0.047, ô8 = 0
ô6 = 0
ô6 = 0.087, ô7 = 0.047, ô8 = 0
ô6 = 0
Fig. 1b. Lifetime utility eliminating the social security tax. Difference from baseline g¯ 0±6.
generations, as well as the size of the externality, g. It is never optimal,
however, to move to full annuitisation of wealth in conjunction with the
elimination of the social security tax.
Fig. 1 presents four scenarios, Plans A–D, under which the social security tax
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is eliminated and the annuitisation rate is raised above the baseline rate. In all
plans the economy starts with c¯ 0±165 and s¯ 0±127. Beginning at t¯ 5 the
annuitisation rate, c, is increased and starting at t¯ 6 the social security tax
rate, s, is eliminated in one or more steps. The feasibility of each plan depends
on the size of the externality, g. When g is small, only plan A, a gradual increase
in the annuitisation rate coupled with a gradual elimination of the social
security tax, and plan D, a one-step increase in the annuitisation rate followed
by one-step elimination of the social security tax, Pareto dominate the baseline
scenario, see Fig. 1a. These two plans, however, are Pareto non-comparable.
The plan favoured by the social planner depends on the relative weights placed
on current versus future generations. If more weight is given to the generations
born at t¯ 5 and t¯ 6, plan D would be chosen. Otherwise, plan A would be
chosen.
When g is large all of the plans except plan B Pareto dominate the baseline
scenario, see Fig. 1b. In this case, plans C and D are Pareto non-comparable.
While plan D Pareto dominates plan A, it does not follow that all variations on
plan A are Pareto dominated by all variations on plan D, even assuming that
the final annuitisation rate in the two plans is the same."'
The choice between plans C and D depends on the relative weights placed
on the lifetime utility of each generation. The current young do best under plan
C which combines a one-step increase in the annuitisation rate with a gradual
elimination of the social security tax. If more weight is given to the near future
generations (i.e. those born at t¯ 6, t¯ 7 , and t¯ 8) then plan D would be
chosen. Otherwise, plan C is preferred.
As discussed above, it is generally not possible to find one plan eliminating
the social security tax and increasing the annuitisation rate that is optimal for
all generations. Nor is there one rate of annuitisation that is optimal for all
generations. As illustrated in Figs. 2a–d, relatively high annuitisation rates
generally favour the initial generation over future generations. For example,
Fig. 2a contrasts two versions of plan A. Both plans are based on a three step
elimination of the social security tax. In plan A1 the annuitisation rate is
increased in three steps to a maximum of 75%. In plan A2 the annuitisation
rate is increased in four steps. The first three steps mimic those of plan A1, with
a final increase in the annuitisation rate to 85% at t¯ 8. Lifetime utilities are
the same under two plans for all generations up through those born at t¯ 7.
For the generation born at t¯ 8 the increase in the annuitisation rate under
plan A2 results in a higher lifetime utility. However, for all subsequent
generations the higher rate of annuitisation under plan A2 reduces their
lifetime utility below that of plan A1. The negative effect of lower bequests in
plan A2 more than offsets the positive effect of the higher annuitisation rate.
If g is small, as in the top panel of Fig. 2a, it is possible that the lifetime utility
of future generations will fall below the baseline if plan A2 is adopted.
Even when g is large, if the annuitisation rate is set too high, the lifetime
utility of some generations will fall below the baseline, as shown in Fig. 2 c.
"' For example, if plan A is : c
&
¯ 0±35, c
'
¯ 0±5, and c
(
¯ 0±6 ; s
'
¯ 0±087, s
(
¯ 0±047, and s
)
¯ 0, and
plan D is : c
&
¯ 0±6 and s
'
¯ 0, then the two plans are Pareto non-comparable.
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Plan A2: ç5 = 0.4, c6 = 0.55, ç7 = 0.75,  ç8 = 0.85 ô6 = 0.087, ô7 = 0.047, ô8 = 0
Plan A1 Plan A2
0·5
0·4
0·3
0·2
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Generation
Fig. 2a. Lifetime utility eliminating the social security tax. Difference from baseline g¯ 0±1 (top),
g¯ 0±6 (bottom).
This result does not imply that the lower annuitisation rate the better. As
shown in Figs. 2b and 2d if the annuitisation rate is too low relative to the
decline in the social security tax rate, the lifetime utility of one or more
generations will fall below the baseline path."(
"( To determine how sensitive our results are to the functional form of the utility function, we simulate
the Plan V version of the model using the general CRRA utility function
c
t
(t)"−r}(1®r)­pc
t
(t­1)"−r}(1®r), for r¯ 0±5 and 2, all other parameters at their baseline values with
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Plan B1: ç5 = 0.4, c6 = 0.55, ç7 = 0.75 ô6 = 0.087, ô7 = 0.047, ô8 = 0
Plan B2: ç5 = 0.55, c6 = 0.65, ç7 = 0.75 ô6 = 0.087, ô7 = 0.047, ô8 = 0
Plan B1 Plan B2
0·6
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0·3
0·2
0·1
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–0·1
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Generation
Fig. 2b. Lifetime utility eliminating the social security tax. Difference from baseline g¯ 0±1 (top),
g¯ 0±6 (bottom).
g¯ 0±7. For both values of r we choose the root that yields positive consumption and well-behaved utility
paths. We find that for r¯ 0±5 (2), cs below [above] the baseline value of 0±165 decrease (increase) [increase
(decrease)] the growth rate of the economy and put the economy on a Pareto inferior (superior) [superior
(inferior)] path. Further, when r¯ 0±5, increasing c at t and decreasing s at t­1 can be Pareto improving.
However, unlike the log utility case (r¯ 1), large increases in c over the baseline are required. These
simulation results lead us to believe that the log specification generates mid-range estimates of the effects of
moving from a pay-as-you-go to a funded social security system. These simulation results are available from
the authors on request.
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Fig. 2 c. Lifetime utility eliminating the social security tax. Difference from baseline g¯ 0±1 (top),
g¯ 0±6 (bottom).
vi. conclusion
In this paper we examine the assertion that increased investment in actuarially
fair annuities is Pareto improving. We derive conditions for this assertion to be
true in steady-state equilibrium and along equilibrium balanced growth paths.
Our results suggest that since annuities reduce the risk of being unable to
predict accurately the timing of death, they can reduce saving. Further, by
pooling the resources of a cohort, they reduce unintended bequests, which has
the side effect of reducing savers’ income and so saving. However, annuities,
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Fig. 2d. Lifetime utility eliminating the social security tax. Difference from baseline g¯ 0±1 (top),
g¯ 0±6 (bottom).
when available by choice rather than mandate, also increase the return to
saving, and thus the incentive to save. The interaction of these different effects
determines whether an increase in the availability of actuarially fair annuities
enhances the incentive to save, thereby increasing capital accumulation,
growth and future social welfare.
An important result of this analysis is that in the model economy a pay-as-
you-go social security scheme can be replaced by an actuarially fair pension
system. Our results should be tempered by the acknowledgement that there are
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no information problems in this model, so everyone faces the same mortality
risk which cannot be affected by individual actions. One suspects that if
information problems were introduced, conditions similar to those derived in
Townley and Boadway (1988) would be required for the government to be able
to implement an optimal, fully-funded social security scheme.
Michigan State Uniersit
Federal Resere Bank of St Louis
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 
Under the assumptions on the utility and production functions an interior, stable,
steady-state equilibrium in which all variables are constant for all t will exist
and be unique if (g­b)! 1. In a steady state, assuming s(t)¯T(t)¯ 0ct, for
Plan V, cv(t)¯cv ct and kv(t)¯ kv(t­1)¯ kv ct, for Plan M cM(t)¯cM ct and
kM(t)¯ kM(t­1)¯ kM ct.
Solving for the steady-state capital stock, consumption of the young, and
consumption of the old, respectively, for Plan V yields
kv ¯ (ap[(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cv)]1­p *
"/("−
b−g)
,
cy,v ¯²a[(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cv)]´"/("−b−g) 90 p1­p1
(b+g)
("−
b−g)
®0 p1­p1
"
("−
b−g): ,
c!,v ¯
ab
p 0
pa
1­p1
(b+g)
("−
b−g)
[p­cv(1®p)] [(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®c)] (
b+g)
("−
b−g).
The social planner chooses cv to maximise
ln cv,y­p ln cv,!
subject to cv " 0. In an interior equilibrium the first order condition of the planner’s
problem can be rearranged to yield
cv ¯
p
(1®p#)b
[(1®b®g)®b(1­p)].
Solving for the steady-state capital stock, consumption of the young, and
consumption of the old, respectively, for Plan M yields
kM ¯
A
B
ap[(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cM)]
1­p­
cM(1®p)
p
C
D
"/("−
b−g)
,
cM,y¯²a[(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cM)]´"/("−b−g) 9 p#p­p#­cM(1®p):
"/("−
b−g)
¬9p­cM(1®p)p# : ,
cM,!¯ a 9b(1®cM)­bcMp : 9
p#a[(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cM)]
p­p#­cM(1®p) :
(b+g)
("−
b−g)
.
The social planner chooses cM to maximise
ln cM,y­p ln cM,!
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subject to cM " 0. In an interior equilibrium the first-order condition of the planner’s
problem is
(1­p)
p­cM(1®p)
®91­p(b­g)1®b®g : 9
b
(1®b)­b(1®p)(1®cM)
­
1
p(1­p)­cM(1®p):¯ 0,
which implicitly defines cM.
Proof of Proposition 
Define for Plan V
gv(t­1)¯
E
F
a(t) p²(1®b) [1®s(t)]­b(1®p) [1®cv(t®1)]´
1­p­
ps(t­1)(1®b)
b[p­cv(t)(1®p)]
G
H
,
and for Plan M
gM(t­1)¯
E
F
a(t) p²(1®b) [1®s(t)]­b(1®p) [1®cM(t®1)]´
1­p­
cM(t)(1®p)
p
­
(1®b) s(t­1)
b
G
H
.
The growth rate of the capital stock under Plan V is
kv(t­1)
kv(t)
®1¯ gv(t­1) kv(t)"/("−b−g)®1,
which is positive if kv(t)"/("−b−g) U 0 more slowly than gv(t­1)U¢. Assume this
condition holds. The growth rate of the capital stock under Plan M is
kM(t­1)
kM(t)
®1¯ gM(t­1) kM(t)"/("−b−g)®1,
which is positive if kM(t)"/("−b−g) U 0 more slowly than gM(t­1)U¢. Assume this
condition holds. Then, anything that increases gv(t­1) [gM(t­1)] increases growth.
Thus, holding the tax rate constant for all t, since, by inspection, both gv(t­1) and
gM(t­1) are decreasing in the tax rate, the higher the tax rate the lower the rate of
growth.
Proof of Proposition 
dgv
dp
¯
a(t)
91­p­ps(t­1)(1®b)b[p­c(1®p)]:
#
¬0(1­p­ps(t­1)(1®b)b[p­c(1®p)]* ²[1®s(t)] (1®b)­(1®c)
¬b(1®2p)´®p²[1®s(t)] (1®b)­(1®c)(1®p)b´
¬(1­c(1®b) s(t­1)b[p­c(1®p)]#*1N 0 for c1 1, " 0 for c¯ 1 ;
and
dgM
dp
¯
a(t)
91­p­c(1®p)p ­
(1®b) s(t­1)
b :
#
¬091­p­c(1®p)p ­
(1®b) s(t­1)
b :
¬²[1®s(t)] (1®b)­(1®c)b(1®2p)´®²[1®s(t)] (1®b)­(1®c)b(1®p)´
¬p 01®cp#11N 0 for c1 1, " 0 for c¯ 1.
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Proof of Proposition 
dgv
dc
¯
a(t)
91­p­ps(t­1)(1®b)b[p­c(1®p)]:
#
0(1­p­ps(t­1)(1®b)b[p­c(1®p)]* [b(p®1)]
­p²(1®b) [1®s(t)]­b(1®p)(1®c)´ 9p(1®p)(1®b) s(t­1)b[p­c(1®p)]# :1! 0
if s(t)¯ 0ct, N 0 otherwise ;
and
dgM
dc
¯
a(t)
91­p­c(1®p)p ­
(1®b) s(t­1)
b :
#
091­p­c(1®p)p ­
(1®b) s(t­1)
b :
¬[pb(p®1)]®²[1®s(t)] (1®b)­b(1®c)(1®p)´ (1®p)}p1! 0
for all s(t).
Proof of Proposition 
This follows directly from Propositions 2 and 4.
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